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Emerging Elites, Oligarchy,  
and the Kenyan Middle Classes
Christian Thibon
Translated by Felix Lambrecht
The topic of emerging elites raises many questions and arouses multiple 
interests. What is brought to light through these elites is the significance 
of the ongoing economic, social and political changes as well as their 
historical trends and their nature. The approach adopted in this chapter 
extends and completes the above presentation (cf. introduction to the 
volume). General trends in Kenyan society are often analysed in terms 
of risk-tensions and following a fatalistic view of society stalled by 
inequality, while the changes within the elite circles are cast in a rather 
positive light through the lenses of renewal and opportunities. Moreover, 
there is a lack of statistical proofs as the question of emerging elites is 
mainly approached through qualitative and biographical research methods 
or through prosopography. These methods nevertheless benefit from a 
stream of academic research on social configurations, the national classes 
and the elites, and on the nature of economic development, all initiated in 
the 1960s and 1970s and still underway (Leys 1975; Van Zwanenberg 1972; 
Swainson 1980; Kaplinsky 1980).
1. Capitalism, Bourgeoisie, Peasantry,  
and the Middle Classes in Debate
In the 1970-80s an important academic debate left its mark on the social 
sciences. It involved the question of Kenya's unique brand of capitalism—
in comparison with that of its neighbours—and what it represented more 
broadly, not just in relation to the nature of economics but in terms social 
history. This debate borrowed from the dependency, Marxist, liberal, and 
developmentalist paradigms then in vogue. While it did not escape the 
theoretical hypotheses of the time about modes of production, it questioned 
and contributed knowledge about the social dimensions of development 
and its chaotic performances, the growth of the 1960s, and the slump of 
the 1970s-2000s interspersed with a few periods of growth (notably the 
coffee boom in 1976–77, and the years 1980–83 just before the drought of 
1984). Important for our purpose, then, are the questions of accumulation, 
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the existence of a national and multinational agrarian power, of a national 
bourgeoisie, be it comprador or not, of a petite bourgeoisie, of African 
or Indian bourgeoisies (Himbara 1994), and finally of the entrepreneurial 
spirit and capitalist ethos of certain groups. The same is true of research 
on the small and medium peasantry, on its rise from the colonial period—
whether this peasantry was captured or not—and on peasant-state relations 
(Kitching 1980; Hyden 1980).
This collective reflection continued in the years of transition, in the midst 
of the economic crisis, which were also a period of hope and questioning 
of economic policies and their state rationality. These times signalled the 
return to the market and privatisation, the rise of civil society and the 
democratic experiment, but also a succession of major politico-financial 
scandals. The “Kenyan malaise” (Gibbon 1995) was thus questioned. 
It had two sides: on the one hand, the economy was in the process of 
liberalisation, struggling with inherited burdens, including corruption 
and social predation; on the other, the resources of entrepreneurship were 
brought forward, including the capacities of the informal sector based on 
the strength of jua kali and its expected resources.1
These past and continuing scholarly debates are important for two 
practical reasons: they raised questions and built knowledge that are still 
relevant today, all the more so as the hypotheses put forward and the 
prospects evoked have or have not been confirmed in the course of the 
history of the last twenty years, which allows us to understand current 
events and even their evolution. The somewhat historical method used 
here—proceeding from the present to the past—could only meet these 
debates, yet requests the adoption of a double historical perspective: firstly, 
that of the present time dating back to the post-World War II colonial 
period; and secondly, that of the “immediate time,” from the 1990s up to 
the present, and particularly of the acceleration of the last two decades
2. The Formation of a National Political  
and Economic Oligarchy?
Understanding the nature and evolution of economic development and 
capitalism sheds light on the formation of a national elite and its current 
social embodiment—“political economic entrepreneurs”—and, beyond that, 
on a social class that can be characterised as more oligarchic than bourgeois. 
The defining feature of this social class is that economic development and 
modes of accumulation were intertwined through the politico-economic 
1. On the debates about enterprises, see Jean Copans (1991).
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elites—a phenomena referred to as straddling that was partly inherited 
from colonial dependency.2
It is possible to reconstruct the history of straddling and its different 
times. From independence onwards, the overlap between the state, 
public interests and private interests, between private business and 
public administration—which was already in its infancy in colonial 
dependency—was reinforced because of the significant economic power of 
an interventionist state at the head of a public economy controlling the 
economic machinery. During the time of Daniel arap Moi, this system was 
reproduced through the strengthening of state power and the protection of 
a nascent industry. But the economic results of this economic management 
were mediocre and irregular. The international context (energy crisis, price 
of major exports) was partly to blame. The double economic predation of 
the state and its public servants through—depending on one’s perception—
corruption or weak governance aggravated the situation. The lack of return 
on investment of financial aid, public debt, and difficulties in food security 
were visible manifestations of this dire economic situation.
The turn of the 1990s with authoritarian decompression, democratisation 
of the transition, and the imposed new liberal economic order (the opening 
of the market, privatisation, adjustment programs…) did not change this 
established politico-economic system. On the contrary, the public-private 
link was maintained through a strategist state, admittedly advised by the 
international financial institutions, that pursued its own strategic interests. 
It then privatised a modern public sector in order to respond to national 
entrepreneurial owners who purchased certain public goods and public 
shareholdings in private companies. This was de facto a second wave of 
Africanisation3 (Aseto & Okelo 1997; Thomas 1998, 40–53).
From the 2000s-2010s, straddling became subtler, more complex and 
more competitive. Mirroring private-public partnerships in major projects, 
it adapted to new economic contexts (with the return of growth), regional 
transformations (with the growth of the East African Community) and 
international change (characterised by the rise of funding and of non-
Western partners). It also adjusted to new commercial and technological 
opportunities, notably in the field of communications. This showed that 
even if the economic situation improved, neither predation nor corruption 
nor bureaucratic red tape disappeared. Dirty business and scandals 
continued, some of them even reaching a peak, but they did not affect in 
2. Presented as a form of dependency on a peripheral economy inherited from 
the colonial period during which the white racial minority negotiated with the 
government




the same way the economy, growth, financial results, and attractiveness 
(the public debt/GDP ratio fell below the 50% mark in the mid- 2010s). On 
the contrary, a steady flow of international and domestic investment was 
betting on the Kenyan economy as a regional economic hub, on its liberal 
management and on the expected payoffs they may have had in resources 
and domestic productions as well as in its domestic market.
The economic history of the straddling is sometimes limited by many 
unknowns, notably its external relays and the levels of its international 
dependence, and it keeps grey areas when it comes to financial exchanges. 
Yet, its social history can be written by looking at the experience of 
accumulation. From independence to the present day, successive political 
and economic systems have given rise to a neo-patrimonial managerial 
elite with both political and economic power. These “political economic 
entrepreneurs” have grown rich in connection with political cycles, while 
the circle of beneficiaries has widened with ethnic renewals or alliances 
at the highest level of power—first Kikuyu then Kalenjin. This circle of 
beneficiaries has also become more diverse since the transition and political 
reforms have opened up the political game. The paths to success were 
varied. Primitive accumulation followed different scenarios: some resulted 
from heroic self-made individuals—of the adventurer and “coal-merchant-
become-millionaire” types—while others were draw from historically and 
family predestined situations, thus benefiting the kin-heirs of political 
dynasties or the descendants-heirs of chiefs from the colonial period. The 
various economic cycles and proximity with the regime turned to their 
advantage. They also owed their trajectories to the allocation of real estate, 
public contracts, concessions, positions in international companies, and 
positions at the State House and in other institutions (Central Bank, Stock 
Exchanges, ports, transport, commercial banks, etc.) as well as to access to 
public funds (Simiyu 2012). Some of these success stories took on a quasi-
dynastic form by following a diversified strategy. Others, often achieved 
through land accumulation, came to an end after a generation in a manner 
reminiscent of kleptocratic trajectories or because they were broken by 
family quarrels. But the majority of these political entrepreneur families 
have been able to overcome the pitfalls of generational change, although 
some have been increasingly confronted with the Buddenbrooks effect.4
The success of these “political entrepreneurs” came from their ability to 
take advantage of various public policies, both interventionist and liberal, 
of agreements with foreign companies and also of privatisations. It also 
lay in lucky or rational choices to invest in booms or speculative cycles, 
to react to various business environments, and to circumvent the political 
4. In reference to Thomas Mann’s novel about the decline of the third generation 
of families.
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setbacks while retreating into economies of affection and making use of 
their ethnic and regional network. Finally, as internationalisation and the 
financial opening of the 2000s progressed, these great fortunes discovered 
the resources of regional markets with sub-regional, Eastern and Middle 
Eastern partnerships, and with deals and investment. It was then that Dubai 
eclipsed London as their business destination. At the end of this evolution, 
the impression was that on turning “millionaires,” these “political economic 
entrepreneurs” have become economic entrepreneurs only, and that as 
wealth has built up, economic interests have had more importance than 
political interests.
This overlap between political and economic calculation is also found in 
a game between closure—a nationalist temptation to Africanise and protect 
markets—and openness, that is, association with foreign companies, or in 
other words between independence and dependence. This state of mind also 
explains the association of these political entrepreneurs with professional 
entrepreneurs, whether Indian or Kenyan (mainly Kikuyu), who have been 
somewhat independent but competent in their field and who ensured the 
recognition of politicians through donations or political commitments.
Paradoxically, distance from power has been a vector of accumulation 
and an explanation for the success of some families. This was first the case 
for the Indian elites who, faced with competition from the Africanisation of 
trade and transport, moved in the 1960s towards the technical and industrial 
sectors, partly abandoning their historical model of the retail shop—the 
duka system—which had allowed them to prosper. Next, this was the case 
for the Kikuyu elites, especially for the generation carried by the Kenyatta 
period but discredited during the Moi period or divided during the time of 
transition-democratisation. The same was true of the new circles promoted 
and then deposed by the successive powers, but which retained their assets 
and escaped the legal fallout of financial scandals. Political decline did 
not automatically translate into economic decline, while the learning of 
new techniques and new industrial, commercial and financial processes 
or their imitation, helped by the capacities of locally trained executives, 
was quickly mastered in contact with the White Kenyan large landowners, 
with representatives of foreign companies and with the Asian masters of 
industry. This interweaving and circulation of the economic and political 
elites can be seen in institutional networks, professional chambers and 
the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), created in 2004, or through 
more informal forms of sociability, such as the large national and regional 
agrarian events (Agriculture Shows), the promotional networks of 
prestigious schools, corporate associations or more exclusive associations 
such as clubs (Connan 2013).
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The conclusion is hardly moral, but today one could say that neo-
patrimonialism, after having prospered in a parasitic way on the economy, 
is accompanying growth and benefiting from the development of a 
national and regional market. This evolution, common to several emerging 
economies as shown by scholars (Bach & Gazino 2012), is illustrated and 
confirmed by individual and collective trajectories, and accumulations and 
investments. Indeed, through case studies, biographies and prosopography5 
and as testified in the increasing number of autobiographies (Ndegwa 2006; 
Wanjui 2013), one can grasp the various generations or historical cycles of 
accumulation, and ultimately, the pace of the formation of an oligarchic 
elite in Kenya.
The first cycle of accumulation was carried out under the presidency 
of Jomo Kenyatta. His family and the dignitaries and collaborators of 
the regime, from KANU and KADU, benefited from the public income. 
Paradoxically in this neo-colonial period, businessmen and their families, 
although nationalists, imitated, at least got closer in their way of life, their 
sociability (clubs and networks of sociability) and land accumulation, to the 
colonial aristocracy of “gentlemen capitalists” and agrarian landowners. In 
similar ways, they exploited land, financial assets, and services. The model 
of success that is representative of this period, apart from the Kenyatta 
family, is exemplified by Kikuyu dignitaries: Sir Charles Njonjo, Njenga 
Karume, John Michuki, Duncan Nderitu Ndegwa… and more generally by 
large Kikuyu owners and their associates (GEMA: Gikuyu Alliance, Embu, 
Meru) often referred to as “mafia,” that is, a network of businessmen and 
politicians relying on their relatives, their clients and their dependents to 
negotiate with state power.
The second cycle coincided with the arrival in power of Daniel arap Moi 
in 1978. It marked a turning point in Kenyan political life with the coming 
to power of the Kalenjin and their allies, but also with a drift towards a more 
authoritarian and dictatorial regime. Wealth accumulation in this period 
followed the path of the previous cycle and developed by taking advantage 
of urban growth, major construction projects, the tourism boom and a 
partially protected private consumer goods and processing industry. Yet it 
expanded to include new families which, besides the Moi family, included 
the first circle of the faithful, often Kalenjin. In a practical way, the Moi 
system, as under Kenyatta but in a more systemic way, surrounded itself 
with allies and local potentates—“big men”—who relayed the central power 
to the periphery and the regions. The latter, in return for their affiliation 
and their political and electoral support, ensured protection in access to 
land and in particular urban land (Bourmaud 1988). This politico-economic 
context also saw the prosperity of an Asian industrial bourgeoisie that 
5. This section uses Damien Thibon’s data and analyses (2014).
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discovered in Kenya a haven of peace (compared with the expulsion of the 
Indians from Uganda in 1972) and invested in the basic industrial sectors, 
agribusiness and consumer goods which were then protected. Individuals 
from this period who represented success were, for example, Nicholas 
Biwott, Joshua Kulei and some large Indian families.
Paradoxically, the 1990s—characterised by the economic crisis and 
political instability—were the glory years of this politico-economic oligarchy. 
This period coincides with the second generation: those of the sons then 
building upon the work of the founding fathers and matriarchs (the wives 
of the founding fathers). Indeed, the new political and economic context 
presided over two noticeable changes: on the one hand the privatisation of 
cooperatives, public enterprises, commercial enterprises, and hotels turned 
to the advantage of the established great fortunes which then recovered 
industrial, tertiary or agribusiness tools which they later cannibalised and 
added value to. On the other hand, the political stakes of the time renewed 
the political class: there were new leaders, new opposition parties and a 
new generation in the image of the “young Turks of KANU.” In a context 
of bargaining between the ruling politicians and the opposition but also 
of ethnic clashes, these newcomers took advantage of the prevailing 
instability and of the opportunity it created to access power and enrich 
themselves. This was the time of the big yet consensual cases of corruption, 
“the Goldenberg era,”6 and of many new promoted fortunes, following the 
example of the new barons of a regime that co-opted them. The newcomers 
to the powerful circle included George Saitoti, William Ruto, Ole Ntimama 
or former opponents like Raila Odinga.
From the 2000s, the return of growth and the economic take-off 
confirmed the economic reputation of these several established families. 
They comprised political families including allies-customers-parents 
(Kikuyu, Kalenjin) close to Kenyatta and Moi, and local entrepreneurs, 
mostly Indians and Kikuyu but also a certain number of established big men 
who were Kisii, Kamba, Luo, Masai, Luhya, Kikuyu7 and from the Coast. 
However, the novelty of this period lay in the emergence of businessmen 
attached to the urban market and involved in transport (matatu networks), 
real estate, finance and insurance, and services. They were joined by new 
personalities from the world of media, Internet, and new technologies. 
These new entrepreneurs, who for some came from the informal sector, 
were certainly supported and sponsored, but they were foreign to 
previous generations. Some of them came from the upper middle class 
promoted by growth. They were either skilled educated individuals who 
had often studied in international universities and possessed prestigious 
6. See in this volume Hervé Maupeu: “State, Economy and Development in Kenya.”
7. Coming from Muranga while those who preceded came from Kiambu or Nyeri.
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Kenyan school degrees, or entrepreneurs in the digital economy and the 
services sector, having started in their careers as senior civil servants in 
national agencies or as executives in foreign companies. Last, there were 
some scandalous trajectories of success through transit and regional or 
international trafficking using informal and illegal ways. The politico-
economic oligarchy and this new generation were connected to Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) respectively through private/public partnerships 
and major construction projects and through investments participation in 
the new digital economy.
This broadening and diversification of politico-economic elites can be 
seen in the use they made of symbolic and cultural capital. Great families, 
like the “great notables,” maintained their traditional symbolic capital 
and identity affiliations, relied on patron-client and religious networks, 
invested in local anchorage in their region of origin and in compassionate 
activities (e.g. through humanitarian associations like the Red Cross, Saint 
John Kenya…), and controlled large press groups—print and audio-visual 
media that proved to be economically very profitable (Nyanjom 2012). 
Contrastingly, the new notability was present in social media, radio, 
university spaces, civil society, and even in certain religious spaces in 
connection with the rise of the new Born-Again churches, Pentecostalism, 
etc. For some, notably those who had emerged recently, opportunism and 
commitment to the regime were no longer the rule.
Recently, through cross-investments or even alliances, these different 
generations and different political, economic and ethnic circles have been 
working together in business associations and consortiums, as if the class 
logic of a national “de place” or “réticulaire” capitalism was now prevailing! 
A “depoliticised” type of capitalism has emerged, which has become 
autonomous from the political sphere and escaped from the practices of 
straddling from which it was born. This trend, which only the future may 
confirm, is perhaps a guarantee of political stability, but it owes its success 
to the somewhat forgotten history of Kenyan capitalism: that of the “non-
political entrepreneurs.”
3. A Second Overlap: Society and Entrepreneurship
This longer history highlights a second overlap, this time between business 
and society. Here, social mobility and low-intensity accumulation in an 
economy of affection, where sociability, often built along ethnic lines, 
plays just as much a role as public protection or the invisible hand of the 
market. The socio-historical and cultural roots of this economic history 
take the form of a spirit of capitalism and an individual moral achievement 
perceptible through various—both long and short termed—collective 
trajectories.
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Colonial history reveals the existence of business associations that 
already had a cultural dimension (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba…) as well as of 
cooperatives. These two opposed types of organisations competed or 
entered into relations with Indian entrepreneurs, already well established, 
and participated in the emergence of an “economic” proto-elite and a 
comprador proto-bourgeoisie. As early as the 1960s, their members were 
running for associate-dealers or were co-opted by Western companies, and 
then invested in new economic sectors. The same goes for a “rural petite 
bourgeoisie”—often accused of loyalty during the Mau Mau insurgency—
that benefited from the boom in coffee growing, land privatisation, and 
urban market demand. Moreover, social mobility was taking place in cities. 
From the 1950s, new urban categories emerged made of the educated, a 
working class and working aristocracy, and in the public space the Black 
staff of the colonial state (clerics, officials, police, military, etc.).8 From 
independence, these social groups—some of them somewhat marginal 
or out of step with the new power—were still very active because they 
were essential elements. A few among them were called upon for the 
construction of public power and the state apparatus and for economic 
revival. This happened at several moments throughout the period: firstly, 
in the 1960s, due to the Africanisation of certain economic sectors (through 
business licenses); then, in the 1970s, through the entry of civil servants 
into business (Ndegwa 1971). And finally, in the 1990s, in the mobilisation 
of the informal sector—jua kali—through the entrepreneurial performance 
or resilience of this sector in certain areas of the urban market. These 
micro-accumulations stumbled on technical or financial limits, yet others 
succeeded and testified to a creative energy. This was the case in artisanal 
production for tourists (Chouabi 2009), in industrial subcontracting, and 
in innovations in tourism services. These promotions, equally understood 
as ways of life and as careers, evolved between survival logics that 
resulted from the hazardous paths of migration and social opportunism, 
between meritocratic ambitions leading to successes and resourcefulness, 
between individual adventures and family strategies through domestic and 
community relays. It is therefore not surprising that some of the successes 
and accumulation paths of the 2010s have been grounded upon these 
experiences and continued to be part of such trajectories.
Moreover, to the extent that the moral economy of affection framed 
and normalised these industrial-commercial adventures, one may wonder 
whether certain inherited or acquired anthropological models shaped such 
an evolution by distilling a certain spirit of capitalism. The topic has given 
rise to stereotyped tribal analyses but it deserves to be addressed. Some 
8. As shown by the latest works of social history on the colonial period, 
following on from Bruce Berman (1990).
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populations traditionally lived in densely populated areas and some ethnic 
groups fed into the groups of migrants and social dependents (cadets) who 
would leave, clear the land and follow a logic of expulsion and expansion. 
Since the colonial period, both fed professional migrations, clearing the 
margins of rural areas in the past and of the cities since independence. 
The same is true of groups who relied on family networks that were fit 
for dispersion and the maintenance of commercial networks, such as 
Kenyan Asians and Somalis. These cultural predispositions—alternatively 
called “ethnic ethos” or “ethnic habitus” (Droz 1999)—become important 
and decisive when, for geopolitical and historical reasons, some of these 
ethnic groups benefited from services, training, openings and employment 
opportunities. This first happened under colonisation with schooling-cum- 
evangelisation, controlled mobility, then access to the state, and it continued 
more so with public modernisation after independence, favouring certain 
territories and certain ethnic groups. Such environments associated with a 
culture of mobility gave them an “entrepreneurial” bonus, forging modern 
models of social ascension and accumulation, at least social primacy. This 
was particularly the case for the Kikuyu, who benefited first from this.
More generally, the historical existence of a social ascension outside the 
oligarchic circuits—even marginal promotion with or without the umbrella of 
the political and economic elites in power—raises the question of grassroots 
opportunities, capacities and potentials. Such mobility contributed to a 
renewal of the economic oligarchy from below. We find this problem of 
upward mobility in the rise of the middle classes as will be shown now.
4. The Emergence of the Middle Classes?
The question of the middle classes, already at the heart of past debates, 
has recently resurfaced for economists particularly as well as for all those 
who, in marketing or commercial potentials, examine the consumer habits 
of these new classes and of their related sub-constituencies, like the youth, 
women, urban households and specific generations. This first approach 
takes into account and favours economic data, income and consumption 
levels.
To date, however, macroeconomic data and their analysis have been 
unsatisfactory for measuring the weight of the middle classes. While the 
GDP that was reached and re-evaluated in 2014 ranks the Kenyan economy 
within the “middle-income countries,” this does not allow for a mechanical 
conclusion that there exists a middle-income class. The link between 
the GDP and the emergence of a middle class has been verified in many 
national contexts, yet a striking phenomenon is also at play: inequality 
distorts income redistribution. In addition, standards defined according to 
international criteria and identifying thresholds, such as that of a “global 
Emerging Elites, Oligarchy, and the Kenyan Middle Classes
117
middle class” defined by an income of 16,800 USD to 72,000 USD per year 
per household, are not relevant. Relative thresholds are more informative 
as they estimate, depending on the country and economy considered, a 
floating daily consumption of between 2 USD and 20 USD per capita for 
emerging countries.9
Practically, definitions and sufficiently precise trend data for the recent 
period starting from 2005 are lacking. For instance, the KNBS sets the 
middle-class in the range of 23,000 KES to 199,000 KES monthly income. 
Such an overly broad approach cannot therefore quantify the share of the 
middle classes, except through a vague consensus figure of 10% to 20% of 
the population, depending on the source used, which is corroborated by 
household wealth surveys about assets and equipment targeting the first 
quintile of “the richest 20%” (KIHBS and DHS). These regular national 
surveys make it possible to classify and better capture an improvement in 
household lifestyle and household wealth in the two top quintiles (from 
20% to 40% of the population), but with strong regional differences. Only 
estimates10 based on labour income (both formal and informal) appear to 
be accurate. These are based on a threshold taking inflation into account—
evaluated between 76,000–100,000 KES monthly in 2015—and places about 
270,000 people into this category. This figure is currently growing as it is 
said to double every 5 years—i.e. 2% of the 15.2 million active employees in 
2015—while high-income earners above 100,000 KES would correspond to 
2.9%, giving a total of middle and upper classes of 4.9%, that is, 700,000 active 
employees. By extrapolating these figures into a number of households, this 
would represent more or less 600,000 households for a population of around 
4 million. However, these data do not take undeclared income into account 
such as rent, real estate income, undeclared activities, and non-taxed trade.
This statistical weakness can be compensated for by using sectoral or 
microeconomic surveys and by studying supply, the economic, social and 
cultural environment and consumer practices. They reveal a process of 
general enrichment, distributed regionally, but do not distinguish social 
variations. Yet, they can help to draw a positive general context. This is 
the case in surveys about financial inclusion for the middle classes as well 
as the poor. For example, they show that the number of bank accounts 
increased from 4.6 million in 2005 to 33.6 million in 2014 while the number 
of mobile accounts rose from 1.3 million in 2007 to 25.2 million in 2014 
(Gubbins 2015). Even if multiple factors—including the boom in mobile 
phones, access to secure transfers, the importance of exchanges on the part 
9. The US poverty line is estimated at 17 USD a day.
10. See the “Middle Class Study” and its presentation by Ivory Ndekei 




of domestic and international migrants, and the evolution of the banking 
system—played in favour of this take-off, this indicator of the financial 
environment reflects a general improvement in living conditions.
The same is true of studies that focus on the lifestyle and consumption 
of the middle classes, the demand for housing and construction (Arvanitis 
2013), consumption patterns and consumer perceptions that give priority 
to quality criteria or appearance (Deloitte 2013), the level of Internet 
connection and use of social networks including Facebook, and the number 
of vehicles and imports…. even if these are goods of distinction that 
households only display on certain days and on special occasions. Other 
indicators confirm this trend. The increase in wage and employment in 
the tertiary economic sector and in the private sector—and particularly 
in national and regional commercial services—that followed on from new 
public policies in the fields of education, local administration, and national 
security testify to a growing number of intermediate socio-professional 
categories, among them the managerial staff even though their income is 
not stable.
Finally, the polling and surveys institutes11 in need of data for their 
sampling frames use two thresholds: a monthly income of 25,000–40,000 KES 
and a high income of above 40,000 KES per household, respectively 11% and 
5% of the population. The former estimate corresponds to the 10% “rich” 
of urban surveys conducted in working class neighbourhoods. It confirms 
the extrapolation from employment statistics, that is, 10% and 16% of the 
population.
In all the cases studied, one constant emerges. The search for intermediate 
variables highlights two key factors: the education of heads of household, 
whether male or female, and urban residency (among which Nairobi stands 
out). The middle classes are aware of this prerequisite, which has a positive 
influence on social advancement and accumulation of domestic wealth. 
Having themselves benefited from the ambitious school policies from 2002, 
they in turn invest in the training of their children and in their continuing 
education, as well as in urban estate, at the risk of going into debt.
The aggregated and cross-tabulated quantitative data thus refute the 
hypothesis of a pivotal middle class, even if average intermediate incomes 
only provide imperfect data about the emerging middle class—and 
considering also that this income is relative: the majority of Kenyans are 
in survival while the levels of wealth accumulation are very high among 
the oligarchy.
As a consequence, the sociological qualitative approach can be of help 
in identifying social configurations. It notably helps us to distinguish and 
11. See the Barometer data for May 2017, and the Ipsos Public Affairs opinion 
polls.
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model three situations. Firstly, there is an “upper middle class” with high 
monthly household incomes, owning one or more real estate properties 
and that is westernised in its way of life and consumer patterns. In this 
group there are successful small-scale entrepreneurs in the informal and 
service sectors, employees in certain private sectors, and high-ranking 
civil servants or employees of the Nairobi hub. Secondly, there is a large 
array of employed “managerial middle class,” following on from the petite 
bourgeoisie of the 1980–1990s but at the limits of the poverty line as they 
are “neither poor nor rich.” Although they are assured of income and have 
accumulated wealth, they are impacted by price variations and inflation, 
to economic conjuncture and to the instability of professional statuses. In 
practical terms, this second group, an erratic middle class, has access to 
malls, franchised restaurants, etc., but they consume little. The remaining 
group are “social entrepreneurs.” Studies have particularly focused on them 
(Ontita 2015) because they exemplify the Kenyan top-down growth that 
takes into account the market of both the urban and the rural poor. This 
group, limited in size but very visible in the media, tells about Kenya’s 
double history of the middle classes. Indeed, these economic actors are 
present in the services (financial, personal, production assistance…) where 
they implement the modernist efforts of the managerial petite bourgeoisie, 
of bureaucrats imbued with development ides—or at least who see 
development as a moral goal—but are also innovative because they master 
the new tools, use the new technological opportunities and walk the lines 
between commercial logic and moral vocations, between private interest 
and collective interest.
These three categories, that is, the “upper middle class,” “managerial 
middle class” and “social entrepreneurs,” share the same social model, but 
without all having the same means. This is confirmed by the study of the 
new demographic behaviours and their evolution within households. A 
minority of households (corresponding to the two upper quintiles) have 
common consumption behaviours and attitudes and refer to a typical 
middle-class family model valuing the nuclear household, the couple and 
the individual (Thibon 2015). This reading is corroborated by the more 
qualitative studies of sociologists, anthropologists and geographers on 
lifestyles. These studies reveal, among other things, the spread of new 
consumer patterns and of practices of social distinction and appearance 
geared towards branded products, new services, safe housing, but also new 
types of interest such as sea and national parks domestic tourism (Rieucau 
2014). In all three cases, modernisation does not call into question the 
links with peasant and provincial kinship based upon economic exchanges 
(through investment, intergenerational transfers or cultural transactions 
during family ceremonies), yet it gradually distends them (Resnick 2015). 
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These diverse and complex middle classes sharing common denominators 
(family model, lifestyle, etc.) reflect how much its current formation is a 
difficult process: the middle classes are learning to live in relative ease and 
are becoming urban, yet they retain their peasant character.
5. The Middle Classes,  
an Ongoing Process of Formation
Therefore, to better understand the ambiguities of the middle classes 
and overcome statistical and conceptual vagueness, if not a hesitant and 
approximate foresight, it is necessary to put this topic into historical 
perspective. This means, among others, reconnecting with scholarly works 
on the social classes and on a two-sided social structuring: one side is about 
the social biography of a group in formation, and the other concerns the 
ways in which these new classes relate to society and the regime, and the 
perceptions they have of these as well as of themselves.
Such history of social representations helps us to grasp continuities as 
well as innovations. It begins at the end of the colonial period. Its starting 
point is the end of the colonial period. The question of the middle classes 
appeared in the 1950s and since then, the public policies put in place 
have consistently aimed to promote the “intermediate classes,” then the 
“national elites,” and now the “middle classes” that are expected to be at the 
foundation of society. All these policies, from the Swynnerton Plan to Vision 
2030, have also carried political projects in search of economic leaders, then 
political leaders who could act as intermediaries or mobilisers depending 
on the projects considered—colonial, nationalist mixed with African 
socialism, democratic, and last, liberal. In this respect, the abundance of 
concepts used to describe these classes is an advantage, yet it can also be 
risky if one uncritically makes use of the “social entities” which political or 
technocratic discourses designate with terms such as “executive managers,” 
“modern sector,” and “national elites” or of the sometimes ideological 
theoretical tools of academic works.
The contribution of the prehistory and history of the middle classes, 
from the 1950s to the present day, is useful to grasp the historical movement 
and its current effects. It can be found in different social figures—similar 
to ideal-types—that each period has promoted. Three figures emerge that 
correspond to three different moments: “the evolved,” “the bureaucrat,” and 
“the entrepreneur.” In reality, the social actors combined a bit of each of 
these three roles depending on the historical context. Yet, their experiences 
and representations converged and participated, together with income and 
heritage, in the formation of a social class.
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Thus, colonisation, in its last decade, implemented a policy targeting 
the “evolved.” This term is borrowed from other colonial experiences 
yet it is appropriate to qualify the Kenyan case—although the condition 
of the Asians and that of the “non-native” somehow blurred the racial 
colonial vision of society. This policy was coherent: it aimed to reinforce 
social intermediaries in rural areas through the creation of an enlightened 
“rural petite bourgeoisie,” as Gavin Kitching observed in the 1950s-1970s 
when studying the social structuring of peasant property. It also aimed to 
supervise its auxiliaries—the African bureaucracy—in the cities as they had 
become essential for colonial action. Such a developmentalist and modernist 
project, weakened by the Mau Mau insurrection that divided the rural 
world between nationalists and loyalists, was pursued and defended by the 
supporters of Western modernisation and of a “third political path.” They 
advocated the promotion of a meritocratic urban-rural petite bourgeoisie 
and the formation of intellectuals, aiming to make up for the structural 
constraints that had delayed the creation of national civil servants. The 
broader objective was the emergence of Kenyan capitalism and the creation 
of liberal urban elite. Such a project was part of the search for a third political 
path (Diouf-Kamara 1991; Charton 2000, 27-48). From independence, such 
a vision had its political supporters but they were contradicted by an 
increasingly authoritarian power in search for hegemony, with its ethnic 
governance and the elitist management of Kenyan universities. This does 
not mean that these “historical losers” disappeared: some emigrated, and the 
majority nestled in economic activities, including coffee production. This 
was the case of the average Kikuyu peasantry who invested in real estate 
in Nairobi (Charlery de la Masselière 1997, 7-8). They also retreated into 
intellectual and legal activities. They initiated internal immigration or were 
taken in by the regime, thus becoming its servants-clients, spokespersons 
and organic intellectuals.
It is in the independence context that the figure of the “bureaucrat” was 
foregrounded and replaced the neo-colonial image of “the evolved.” The 
national elites in charge of an interventionist and regulatory state that 
promoted them and who were reinforced by the single party then fit best into 
the nationalist projects of President Jomo Kenyatta and even more of Daniel 
arap Moi. A small directorial bourgeoisie then appeared. It was quite diverse 
and hierarchical, and maintained (or not) links to the rural petite plantation-
holding bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic class of the colonial period. Its 
emblematic professional figures ranged from the school teachers to high-
ranking civil servants—thus reproducing the colonial wage hierarchy. They 
also ranged from the askari to the district or provincial commissioners, in 
continuity with a colonial public order turned national order… They all 
benefited collectively but unequally from public employment, jobs in the 
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politico-economic system or in the formal parastatal sector, and the welfare 
state—more precisely from the salaries that the welfare state provided as 
well as from some privileges in health and housing, bridges between the 
public and the private sector, the Africanisation of employment, and access 
to commercial licenses. This managerial petite bourgeoisie, endowed with 
intellectual capital, inherited respectability and a somehow symbolic capital 
of command that compensated for limited income. Yet in the 1990s, such 
social advancement stalled. The economic crisis and adjustment programs, 
followed by political and ethnic struggles, changed the situation: they 
weakened the managerial petite bourgeoisie, hindered its evolution and 
destabilised it. Confronted with reduced resources and with economic and 
adjustment programs, it became divided between resilience, corporatist 
withdrawal, and ethnic temptation. A first group, dismissed, was tempted by 
the promise of private enterprise and fell into informality. A second group, 
impoverished, downgraded by inflation and prey to general instability, 
protected itself as best it could according to the power of the professional 
unions they could rely on. And a third group supplemented their insufficient 
wage by resorting to related sources of income, such as public/private 
duplication, a return to the private sector, and corruption. Since 2002, this 
declining managerial petite bourgeoisie has unevenly benefited from growth 
while it has rubbed shoulders with the social ascents of certain private 
activities. Only a part of it—the high civil service, the liberal professions, 
and some professions in education and health—has managed to maintain 
its symbolic and cultural capital as well as its revenues through traditional 
areas that could be safeguarded (the university, the exercise of law) and 
through new services to business which the new economic and political 
contexts had enhanced.
The growth of the 2000s legitimised a new dominant figure among the 
middle classes, if not a whole new generation: “the small entrepreneur.” The 
social rise of “micro-entrepreneurs,” caught between survival and desire for 
accumulation, has played out on several levels: public and private resources, 
wage income, and investments in the informal sector (mechanical, electrical, 
computer repairs, etc.), agriculture and its new commercial productions and 
outcomes (e.g. foodstuffs kiosks), services (e.g. matatu), land and property 
return, and speculative urban and rural income. These entrepreneurs 
without an enterprise—who, since the 1990s, research on the informal 
sector has tried to understand by going beyond the image of the jua kali 
(handicraft and informal sector)—have taken advantage of new markets, 
new technologies and a high-tech D system with the intelligence of survival. 
They did it through new services and even through illegal activities that 
ensured a quick return on limited investment in an untaxed informal sector. 
These entrepreneurs can be found in the city where the most opportunities 
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are available, including in the slums (where they play the role of “little 
big men”) and in the countryside where petite peasant landowners—
following the former model of peasantry or in break with it—have occupied 
production niches linked to the urban market (horticulture, dairy farming, 
khat, meat…). These post-coffee modes of exploitation are often at odds with 
those of the elders, so much so that these innovative rural entrepreneurs 
are very often young people and women. Could this be an effect of the 
demographic dividend? Indeed, this educated youth familiar with digital 
technologies has quickly adapted to new products and marketing. Or could 
it be an effect of the gendered dividend? However, this energy overflow is 
not enough. In addition to skills and domestic mobilisation, the economy 
of affection and relationships have become necessary to reap the benefits 
of new interdependencies and new jobs and opportunities (Mbataru 2009).
As spectacular as this emergence of the new middle classes may be—
with its social markers and models, its car fleet, its material culture, its 
sociability, its modernity, and especially its role in the civil society and 
through the intellectuals—, they remain the minority, both in the city and 
even more in the countryside. Taking up Marxist phraseology, they are a 
“class in itself,” in gestation, not a “class for itself.” Certainly, the boundaries 
and social practices defining collective identity are gradually solidifying, 
but they remain porous. The new middle classes are confronted either with 
dangerous popular classes, at least perceived as such, or with networks of 
poor rural kinship, from which they come and to which they are related 
and often indebted. Yet the risk of overflow and downgrading still lingers, 
and the control of rural elders is still significant. Moreover, the new 
middle classes are also limited in their social ascent by the shortcomings 
of the Kenyan political economy, by the reserved domains of the higher 
political-economic elites—although some can access them—and by cyclical 
variations. This in-between situation and this social mobility are a source 
of anxiety, all the more so as the public systems and services and the liberal 
economy do not offer them any guarantee. Hence the cautious behaviours 
they develop by multiplying socio-economic, spatial and moral protections. 
It is noticeable that they embrace political modernity and the defence of 
human rights, which both serve as security for their acquired rights, but also 
the defects of political life such as ethnic residency, ethnicity and tribalism 
(Maupeu 2012). Moreover, these attitudes vary according to the power 
relations—of a quasi-demographic nature—that the middle classes can exert 
in some urban spaces. They also depend on associations with some groups, 
on more or less close contact with their Asian social neighbours, and on 
their ability to transcend ethnic divisions through inter-ethnic marriages, 
which enables them to become cosmopolitan and urban Nairobians and to 




This reading of the social changes within the Kenyan elites—that is, 
within both the oligarchy and the middle classes—and of their historical 
trajectories completes and modifies the bipolar or tripolar analysis of an 
exclusive society in accordance with and inherited from the past. It reveals 
a society that is as unequal as in the past, with a continually high level of 
poverty. It is a conflictual society, but a society in motion that is constantly 
changing the lines of social partition and collective identities. Changes 
are very real within the social structures, with frequent and commonplace 
discrepancies12 between the rapid pace of economic and technical changes, 
the slower social practices experienced by societies as well as the slower 
trends or weight of collective representations. Such discrepancies are 
reflected in variations between social norms and individual and household 
practices, which sometimes involves authoritarian cultural constraints. 
They also result in cultural tensions that crystallise on social issues 
debated by the press but also experienced within households (the freedom 
of the youth, clothing…). Public opinion delights in gauging the scope of 
individualism's moral pitfalls, and though social mobility imperceptibly 
shapes and creates new opportunities for generations to come, it also 
imposes a debt from the fallout of such growth. The nature of economic 
growth, however, even if it benefits all but unequally, remains poorly 
integrative. It leaves to the political power and public policies the task 
of redistribution and the creation of national solidarity, a new political 
economy (Bourguignon 2004), a social protection policy 13 and the 
maintenance of a national community bond that is hampered by identity 
and ethnic biases that modernisation has not yet erased.
The challenge ahead lies in the political capacity of the elites to cushion 
the social effects of liberal growth and to accompany the stratification or 
social mobility processes. Ultimately, those living in periphery societies 
that had long been confined to particular space-times remain in the shadow. 
In these societies, there has been a rapid advancement amongst the elites 
thanks to structural and politico-economic changes, and the numbers of 
university graduates are high. The question now becomes: will they come 
12. According to the expression and image of the discrepancy of changes used 
by historian Fernand Braudel, who speaks of “the delay of culture on the social,” 
and of “the delay of the social on the economic.”
13. Sectoral policies were launched for the youth and vulnerable people based 
on both common type and innovative programs, including cash transfers to 
OVC and the elderly.
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soon on to the scene of Kenyan society, or will they conversely be tempted 
to break away?14
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